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Abstract
We investigate how North-South Integration aﬀects the location of FDI between the two
regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration aﬀects the incentives of partner and
non-partner Northern countries to locate in the South diﬀerently and may lead to investment
diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first major North-South integration scheme.
Using the largest possible control group, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator to find
that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what
is implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other
countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We also find no evidence
that inward U.S. FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of diﬀerent model
and econometric specifications as well as the skill data used.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional integration
schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Europe while at
the same time continuing its move towards “deep” integration. Many developing countries in Asia
and South America have pursued economic integration amongst themselves (ASEAN, Mercosur) or
have sought free trade agreements with other developed countries or blocs, such as the EU or the
United States. In North America, the 1989 U.S.-Canada free trade agreement was followed quickly
by the inclusion of Mexico into a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The latter
had been unique at the time as it combined two advanced developed with a developing country, a
phenomenon dubbed the ‘new regionalism’ by Ethier (1998).
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important eﬀects on international economic
interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements has focused on their impact on trade
flows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the partners in the agreement) and
trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement). But economic integration and its
coincident reduction in trade barriers also alters the incentives for firms when making their location
decisions. With NAFTA, the conventional wisdom is that the reduced trade barriers facing exports
fromMexico into the U.S. increase the incentive for firms to locate in comparatively low-cost Mexico
and use it as an export platform.
Another important reason why one would expect NAFTA to change the location pattern of
multinational firms is the commitment eﬀect conveyed by the agreement. The commitment value
arises as integration agreements bind future regimes to reforms undertaken and acts beyond any
eﬀects due to specific provisions of the agreement. Thus it alleviates the well-known time inconsis-
tency problem whereby countries have an incentive to impose a higher tax rate ex post although
they had committed to national treatment for foreign investors ex ante. This consideration is
particularly relevant for Mexico with its history of political instability, default and expropriations.
Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1998) show that a trade accord indeed allows a country to sustain
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a higher level of investment than without it. Waldkirch (2006) examines the case of two North-
ern and one Southern country and finds that following integration between the Southern and one
of the Northern countries, the commitment eﬀect more strongly aﬀects partner than non-partner
investment due to trade creation and trade diversion eﬀects.
Hence, while the incentive to locate in Mexico rather than in one of the two advanced partners
exists for all firms, these incentives diﬀer for firms from partner versus firms from non-partner
countries for a number of reasons. First, beyond the diﬀerential commitment eﬀect, the Maquiladora
program provided for reduced duties for Mexican exports into the U.S. even before NAFTA. Upon
re-importation, Section 9802 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule stipulates that only the value-
added part of the imported good is subject to duties. Moreover, U.S. duties were relatively low
even before NAFTA. Hence, NAFTA may not greatly increase the incentive for U.S. firms to locate
more production in Mexico as compared to non-U.S. firms. Second, as a free trade area rather
than a customs union, NAFTA has relatively strict rules of origin. For example, 62.5 percent of an
automobile must have North American content in order to qualify for duty-free treatment. This
may reduce or increase the incentive for non-US firms to locate in Mexico. On the one hand, the
size of the investment may be bigger than optimal in the absence of rules of origin. On the other
hand, trying to force locating a production process that may be optimally placed at home, e.g.
skilled labor intensive production, may tilt the incentive towards not locating any production in
the free trade area. Finally, NAFTA reduces the trade cost of shipping any intermediate inputs to
Mexico from the U.S., but not from other countries.
This paper investigates the eﬀect of North-South integration on the location of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in both regions. The empirical analysis uses the case of NAFTA and pays special
attention to partner versus non-partner country FDI. Despite the great importance of the eﬀects of
economic integration on firm location, there is a dearth of empirical work in that area. Waldkirch
(2003) uses aggregate inward FDI data for Mexico to find that NAFTA appears to have raised FDI
from the U.S., but not from other countries. Cuevas et al. (2005) use results from a cross-country
study to estimate a NAFTA eﬀect on FDI generally of about 70 percent, but do not distinguish
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the source of investment. Similarly, MacDermott (2007), using OECD data from 1980-1997, finds
an increase in FDI following NAFTA in participating countries but no intra-NAFTA eﬀect. Our
contribution to the literature is to investigate the eﬀect of NAFTA on FDI comprehensively by
considering Mexican as well as U.S. inward FDI from various sources. Moreover, by employing a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator on the largest possible sample of global FDI, we are better able
to disentangle the eﬀects of NAFTA from other changes in the world economy, such as a worldwide
rise in multinational activity in the 1990s, unlike the aforementioned studies.
To motivate the empirical analysis, which is the main contribution of the paper, we consider a
three-country model (two Northern countries and one Southern country) based on Ekholm et al.
(2007).1 The Southern country is the low-cost location and firms from either Northern country may
locate the final goods assembly process in the Southern country. Initially, trade costs are the same
among all countries2. Then, one of the Northern countries integrates with the Southern country.
We can think of this scenario as depicting the integration of the United States and Canada (the
North) with Mexico in NAFTA. Our model diﬀers from Ekholm et al. (2007) in the following
respects. First, we do not confine the production of intermediate goods to a firm’s home market;
instead we assume that at least one of the production facilities -intermediate or final- must be
located in the home market. Second, we assume that firms’ fixed costs are invariant to location
strategy. Having made this assumption, we focus on diﬀerent location configurations for sales only
in the large, high-cost economy integrating with the small, low-cost economy. Third, our results
point out that regional integration not only leads the outsider Northern firm to shift production
from the insider Northern economy to the low-cost, Southern economy but also back to its home
country.3
1Grossman et al. (2006) examine the integration strategies of heterogeneous multinational firms in a three-country
setting. They do not consider economic integration eﬀects, although their model could be extended to do that.
Motta and Norman (1996) analyze integration in a three-country model. However, in their model there is no scope
for vertical FDI since final goods production takes place in a single stage. In our model, on the other hand, the
location of intermediate goods production is in the strategy space we consider.
2Note, however, that we do incorporate the features of the Maquiladora program discussed above.
3By focusing on NAFTA’s eﬀect on the United States and Mexico, we do not imply that FDI in or from Canada
would not be aﬀected. However, NAFTA can largely be viewed as Mexico’s addition to the existing U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which we analyze in this paper. A detailed study of NAFTA’s eﬀect on the distribution
of FDI between the U.S. and Canada is undertaken in Waldkirch and Tekin-Koru (2008).
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There are a number of predictions that emerge from our model. Chief among them is that
not only may North-South integration increase FDI in the South by partner firms, but it may also
decrease investment in the North, ceteris paribus, which we term ‘FDI diversion’. The eﬀect on
non-partner investment in Mexico is potentially ambiguous, but is clearly diﬀerent from the eﬀect
on partner investment for the reasons discussed above. Unlike in Ekholm et al. (2007), regional
integration may not only lead non-partner FDI to be shifted from the North to the South but
also back to its home country. We then test these propositions via a single diﬀerence as well as
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. We include the standard determinants of FDI identified in
the recent work of Markusen (2002), which reduces the likelihood of spurious correlations, thus
increasing our confidence that we indeed isolate the eﬀect of NAFTA.
We use the standard FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that has been
widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity, e.g. by Brainard (1997),
Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002), Blonigen et al. (2003) and Yeaple (2003) and add
data on inward Mexican FDI from INEGI, the Mexican National Statistical Institute. In order to
have the broadest possible sample of non-NAFTA countries for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis,
we also use bilateral OECD FDI data. Since we need to identify source countries of investment
and use compatible data from all sources, our data are stock data at the aggregate level. While
most studies using U.S. data use aﬃliate sales, such data are not available for Mexico. Only flows
and stocks of FDI are available. We cannot add industry detail either, in large part because no
industry-source country detail is available for Mexico prior to 1994.In order to estimate the eﬀects
of NAFTA, however, we need a reasonable amount of pre-NAFTA data.
Our results indicate that since NAFTA’s inception, FDI in Mexico from the U.S. and Canada
has increased, but not from other countries. Indeed, there is some evidence of a slight fall from
the latter. We also find no evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S. We caution, however, that we
only include foreign investment data in our empirical analysis, while our model allows for a strictly
domestic location configuration as well. Thus, we are not able to identify U.S. investments that
switch from being domestic before, but become foreign (Mexican) after NAFTA. The potential
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investment diversion we account for is solely by non-U.S. firms.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be robust. We carefully correct for both country-
pair specific autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis. We use skill
data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, e.g., Carr et al. (2001), but also
the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, e.g., Blonigen et al. (2003). The results are
also robust to the consideration of an “announcement eﬀect” since NAFTA was anticipated before
its formal inception.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out a three-country model of the location
choice of firms. While it restricts the set of possible location configurations for tractability, it
is suﬃciently general to allow for a range of relevant cases. The following section presents the
empirical model which is designed to allow testing of the main hypotheses generated by the theory.
After a discussion of our econometric approach and the data, the empirical results are presented,
followed by concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simple model of location choice and economic integration. There are
three countries, two (initially identical) high- and one low cost country. There exists one firm in
each of the high-cost countries that is faced with the decision where to produce an intermediate
good and where to assemble the final good. We first formulate the assumptions and the game played
by the firms. We cannot find an analytical solution to the quantity-location game. While we could
use numerical simulations as in Ekholm et al. (2007), we instead concentrate on the equilibrium
candidates by dropping the strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values. The remaining
nodes of the game represent the "feasible equilibria". Then, we consider two scenarios: one where
there is no economic integration and one where one of the high cost and the low cost country
integrate. Finally, we compare the results of these two games to arrive at testable hypotheses.
Consider a one-period, two-stage static game in which there are three countries, denoted E, U
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and M . Countries E and U are identical; they can be referred to simply as N (North). M is a
small, low cost country in the south. There exist two final goods sectors; X (increasing returns,
imperfect competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect competition) and one intermediate good
(component) Z. Good Y is produced from a single factor L (Labor), where one unit of L produces
one unit of Y . Good X, on the other hand, is produced using the intermediate good Z and factor
L, both in fixed proportions. The linear demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility
function maximized subject to a budget constraint. Income is derived from labor and profits.
maxU = φX −
µ
θ
2
¶
X2 + Y subject to L+Π = Y + pX (1)
where wages and the price of Y are numeraires. The demand function for good X is as follows:
p = φ− θX (2)
We assume that there are two firms producing X, one headquartered in E and one in U , and
these can be referred to as firms e and u, respectively. Each firm aims to maximize profit in country
U through its choice of production location configuration and the quantities supplied to the market.
In the first stage of this location-quantity game, each firm chooses its location configuration and in
the second stage makes its quantity choice in a usual Cournot setting by taking the market location
configuration from the previous stage as given. A strategy for firm h has two elements:
(i) the firm’s production location configuration for sales in country U which is a set of ordered
pairs
lh = {ij} (3)
where h = (e, u}. The first element i signifies the location choice for the intermediate goods
production and the second one j for the final goods production. The configuration lu =
{UM}, for example, means that firm u supplies its own market from an assembly plant in M
which uses components produced in U . We assume that at least one of the production facilities
-intermediate or final- must be located in the home market. As a further simplification, we
assume that any production in M consists of final assembly. In essence, this confines the
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intermediate goods production sites to i = {E,U} and the final goods assembly can be done
anywhere, j = {E,U,M}. Finally, since M is a small country, we assume that it has no
domestic demand, and so neither firm will build a plant in M simply to serve M . These
assumptions still leave us with a wealth of possibilities to explore such that there are a total
of 4 location configurations for each firm which generates 16 potential market supply strategies
in country U . Define a market location configuration as:
l = {le, lu} ∈ L (4)
where L is the set of all possible production location configurations for sales in country U .
(ii) the firm’s quantity choice which is
xh(l) (5)
where xh(l) > 0 indicates that firm h is active in country U ; xh(l) = 0 indicates that firm h
chooses not to sell in country U . Costs of production for the two firms are assumed identical.
Unit costs for components production in country i, (zi) and final goods production in country
j, (cj) need not be identical. These costs are identical across E and U , but lower in M , i.e.
zM < zN and cM < cN .
Establishment by firm h of a production facility in country i or j incurs a set-up cost F and
we simplify the analysis by assuming that these set-up costs are neither country nor firm specific.
Observe that a firm’s quantity choice in two markets is independent and determined by the market
location configuration l, and therefore the total set-up cost of establishing production facilities for
sales in country U always adds up to 2F .
Trade costs are assumed to be ad-valorem. The tariﬀ rate is tij ∈ (0, 1), i 6= j for components
trade from country i to country j, and tjk ∈ (0, 1), j 6= k for final goods trade from country j to
country k. We assume that tij = tjk = t for the sake of simplicity. This rate becomes zero between
a country pair in the case of economic integration. On a given link we assume that the cost is the
same in both directions for reciprocity reasons.
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Aggregate supply to the consumer in country U given the market location configuration l, is:
X(l) =
X
h
xh(l) (6)
and the aggregate profit to firm h from sales in country U with market location configuration l and
market quantity choice xh(l) is:
Πh(l, xh(l)) = (1− t)[p(X(l)]xh(l)− bch(lh)xh(l)− 2F (7)
where bch(lh) = [1 + t]zi + cj for i = {E,U} and j = {E,U,M}. For example if firm e chooses to
produce the intermediates in E and assembles them in U for sales in U , then le = EU . In this case,
the production costs will be bce(le) = [1 + t]zE + cU .
The exception is the configuration, lu = {UM}, where bcu(UM) = zU + cM . Before integration,
tariﬀs for imports of final goods from M to U are only levied on the value-added portion.4 This
is consistent with the Maquiladora program that has been in existence for many years and has
facilitated production in Mexico by U.S. firms. It is important to account for the special provisions
since they aﬀect the impact of North American integration on partner versus non-partner firms.
Denote by Xh(l) the set of possible quantity choices in market U for firm h given the market
location configuration l. The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the second-stage quantity
sub-game for any market location configuration l is the market quantity choice x∗(l) such that:5
Πh(l, x∗(l)) ≥ Πh(l, xh(l), x∗−h(l)) for all xh(l) ∈ Xh(l) (8)
Denote by Π∗h(l∗) the profit to firm h from the Nash equilibrium market quantity choice cor-
responding to the production location configuration l. An equilibrium for the first-stage location
game is a market location configuration l∗ such that:
Π∗h(l∗) ≥ Π∗h(lh, l∗−h) for all l ∈ L (9)
4 If we drop the location indicators and firm superscripts, in the Maquiladora case the profits of firm u can be
written as Π = p(X)x− zUx− cMx− tUMzUx− tMU (p(X)− zU )x− 2F where (p(X)− zU )x is the value added from
the assembly activities. If tUM = tMU = t, then Π = (1− t)p(X)x− ecx− 2F where ec = zU + cM .
5See Appendix for profit functions.
8
2.1 Before Integration
Table 1 presents the market supply strategies and their associated payoﬀs before integration. Each
cell is assigned a number which is stated at the lower left corner of the corresponding cell. The
payoﬀs are the profits made by each firm in the equilibrium of the Cournot game. Each cell in this
table represents a market location configuration, l = {le, lu} ∈ L where elements of l describe the
respective supply strategies of firms e and u in country U . For example, cell number 6 in Table 1
is l = {EU,UM} which translates as follows: Firm e supplies country U from an assembly plant
in U which uses components produced in E, whereas firm u supplies country U from an assembly
plant in M which uses components produced in U .
We cannot find an analytical solution to this quantity-location game. While we could use
numerical simulations, we instead concentrate on the equilibrium candidates by dropping the strictly
dominated strategies for all parameter values. Then we derive the changes in these candidates due
to economic integration. The shaded cells in the tables are the candidates for equilibria in this
quantity-location game, namely the feasible equilibria.6 Any one or more than one of these cells
can be the equilibrium/equilibria depending on the parameter values.
Before economic integration between U and M , UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies
for firm u and UE is a strictly dominated strategy for firm e. The intuition is that if firm u
outsources any part of its production process, it will always be to M since it has lower production
cost than E, while trade cost are no higher.
Lemma 1 Prior to integration between U and M, if u does not invest in M, neither does e.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for firm u is lu
∗
= UU for sales in U , then EM can never be the
dominant strategy for firm e. Note that firm e always deviates from cell number 3 to cell number 2
since the condition for UU to be dominant for firm u also satisfies the condition for EU to dominate
6A sample of the calculations that generate these results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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EM for firm e. If firm u chooses to remain national, then even though unit costs are lower in M ,
firm e will not prefer to produce intermediates in E, ship them to M for assembly and reship the
finished product to U and thus pay tariﬀs twice. In other words, if firm u chooses UU over UM ,
then firm e will never choose EM over EU since the production cost diﬀerences between North
(E and U) and South (M) are not large enough to cover trade costs for both the shipment of the
intermediates and the final products for firm e to prefer EM.
2.2 After Integration
Given that we are chiefly interested in the eﬀects of North American economic integration on foreign
direct investment, we concentrate on the case in which a regional bloc is established between
countries U and M. In that case, the tariﬀ barriers on both intermediate and final goods trade
between U and M are completely lifted, making tUM = tMU = 0.
Table 2 shows the payoﬀ matrix after such integration. Notice the reductions in the number of
candidate equilibria compared to the situation before integration. For firm u, UU , UE and EU are
strictly dominated strategies and UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies for firm e. Only
cells number 7 and 8 remain as equilibrium candidates after integration.7
Changes in the feasible equilibria after economic integration yield a rich set of propositions
about FDI creation/diversion in each of the production locations. We restrict our attention to the
possibilities which can be derived analytically without numerical simulations. All of our propositions
assume that demand in both markets remains unaﬀected by integration.
Proposition 1 Integration between U and M has an FDI diversion eﬀect in U if le
∗
= EU before
integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
7 Intuitively, one expects EM to dominate EE for firm e after integration since it involves lower assembly costs
and a tariﬀ only on the intermediate goods as opposed to higher assembly costs and a tariﬀ on the final good in
case of EE. However, note that after integration cell number 8 involves a higher market price when compared to
cell number 7. Therefore, it is possible to observe EE as the dominant strategy for firm e and thus no FDI after
integration. The proof is available upon request.
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This proposition rests on the fact that for firm e, the strategy involving production in U ,
EU , is a dominated strategy after integration. Thus, if before integration the dominant strategy
is le
∗
U = EU , then final assembly is shifted either to E, in which case there is only investment
diversion, or to M , in which case there is investment creation in M . In other words, investment
diversion from U is by non-partner countries. Note that UU becomes a dominated strategy for
firm u, but since we focus on foreign, not domestic investment, we do not test this prediction of
the model.
Proposition 2 Integration between U and M increases firm u’s investment in M if lu
∗
= UU before
integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition stems from the fact that UU becomes a dominated strategy for firm u after
integration. If that strategy was dominant before integration, some production is shifted from U
to M which is the dominant strategy for firm u after integration. Another way of interpreting this
result is that economic integration causes new entry into the southern country by firms in U . If
the pre-integration equilibrium is not UU , there may be no change in M -production by firm u.
Proposition 3 Integration between U and M increases third-country (E) investment in M only if
and only if le
∗
= EU and lu
∗
= UU before integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for firm e before integration is le
∗
= EU and lu
∗
= UU for firm u, then
the final assembly is shifted toM by firm e, and non-partner country investment inM will increase.
This is due to the fact that the conditions for EU to be dominant for firm e before integration also
satisfy the condition for EM to dominate EE for firm e after integration.
Note that a switch from EM before integration to EE after integration (and thus investment
diversion fromM) is not possible since the condition for EE to be dominated before integration by
any other strategy is the same after integration and does not involve the tariﬀ between integrating
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countries. However, the condition does involve the unit cost of producing in M . One could model
rules of origin as increasing this unit cost since they force a firm to locate additional parts of the
production process along with the optimally located ones in M in order to achieve the required
minimum local content, as discussed above. In that case, a switch from EM to EE (and thus
investment diversion from M) is a distinct possibility.
This proposition tells us that an increase in export platform FDI inM by non-partner countries
is possible only under special conditions. In other words, if the dominant strategy for firm u before
and after integration is lu
∗
= UM, then firm e supplies the U market with exports from E. This is
formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If firm u has investment in M before integration (the Maquiladora case) then an
increase in third-country (E) investment in M is not possible.
In summary, the model predicts that FDI in U may be diverted toM . Partner and non-partner
country investment in the low-cost country,M , may increase. However, the conditions under which
investment from the partner versus the non-partner country increases diﬀer for the two sets of
countries, i.e. the identity of the source country matters. Moreover, there might be circumstances
where there might be no increase or even a decrease in the investments of non-partner countries in
M depending upon the pre-integration equilibrium. Thus, the question whether there is investment
diversion from the U.S. and investment creation/diversion in Mexico, and by whom, is an empirical
one.
3 Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to test the propositions from our model outlined above while including con-
trol variables drawn from the existing literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment.8
These come from the seminal study by Brainard (1997) and the pioneering work of Markusen (1997)
8Ekholm et al. (2007) also conduct an empirical analysis, which, however, is very diﬀerent from ours. Their
dependent variable is the share of aﬃliate sales of US multinationals that go to third countries rather than foreign
investment. They only use US data and do not have a breakdown of these shares by country.
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and Markusen (2002), which were put to an empirical test in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and
Maskus (2002).
We test the propositions generated by our model employing a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator.
Specifically, let
FDIijt = α+ βdr + γDh + δ (dr ·Dh) (10)
where FDIijt is FDI in i from source j at time t; r denotes the regime (NAFTA or non-NAFTA)
and h denotes host-type, to be explained below. dr is a dichotomous variable that is equal to one
if the regime is NAFTA (1994 and later), and equal to zero if it is not.9
Dh is a vector of dichotomous variables, one for each of three host types. Let dh1 equal one
if the U.S. is the host country of FDI, for any source country other than Canada or Mexico. Let
dh2 equal one if Mexico is the host and the U.S. or Canada are the source countries. Finally, let
dh3 equal one if Mexico is the host country and the source is any country other than the U.S. and
Canada. The model thus can be written as
FDIijt = α+ βdr +
3X
k=1
γkdhk +
3X
k=1
δk (dr · dhk) (11)
The estimated impact of NAFTA for a particular host-type is then given by the δk’s, the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. Proposition 1, which states the possibility of FDI diversion from
the U.S., implies that δ1 is negative. Propositions 2 and 3, which state the possibility of increased
FDI in Mexico from NAFTA. and other countries, respectively, imply significantly positive δ2 and
δ3, respectively. To see this, note that α is the baseline eﬀect for observations that are pre-NAFTA
(dr = 0) and are not of a (future) NAFTA host (dhk = 0 ∀ k). Then, α+β is the eﬀect of NAFTA on
non-NAFTA hosts. The diﬀerence, i.e. the “NAFTA-eﬀect” is therefore given by β. For host type
k, the pre- and post-NAFTA eﬀects on FDI are given by α+ γk and α+ β + γk + δk, respectively,
with the diﬀerence, the “NAFTA-eﬀect”, being β+δk. Hence, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate
is given by δk. While the signs, magnitudes and significance levels of the δk’s are going to be of
9As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of NAFTA in consideration of a possible announcement eﬀect.
We also experimented with including separate dichotomous variables for 1994 onwards and 1999 onwards, recognizing
that tariﬀ cuts were phased in. This did not change the results (Available upon request).
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central interest, we will also report the single diﬀerence results.
Two comments on the use of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator are in order before we
proceed to the other controls included in the empirical model. First, since the eﬀects of NAFTA
that we identify here are all relative to a control group, the identity of the control group matters.
Initially, we used two diﬀerent control groups. The first includes all FDI observations among
non-NAFTA countries as well as U.S. and Canadian outward FDI. The latter is outside of our
model and one could argue that most of that FDI is in other highly-developed countries which are
quite dissimilar from Mexico and are thus unlikely to contain many competing hosts. However,
increasingly other low-cost countries, in particular in South-East Asia, are attracting developed
country FDI. Moreover, our hypothesis that U.S. FDI is more likely to go to Mexico due to its
relative increase in attractiveness should aﬀect its outward FDI to other countries, even though we
do not model this explicitly. Hence, our second control group consists only of FDI between countries
other than the three North American ones. We report results from using the latter in the text and
tables and note any diﬀerence in the results using the wider control group in a footnote. The
second issue pertains to econometric problems in the use of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator
as detailed in Bertrand et al. (2004). We discuss how we address these in the next section.
For other control variables to include in the empirical model, we appeal to the standard FDI
literature. We employ the most general specification from Markusen and Maskus (2002) as our
base specification. We also use similar specifications to those suggested in Blonigen et al., 2003,
Braconier et al., 2005, and Waldkirch, 2003.10
Thus, we augment the model by including the following controls:
FDI = f
⎛
⎜⎝
sumgdp, gdpdiﬀsq , d2skdgdpd, d2skdsumg, d1skdsumg,
invcosthost , topenhost, topensrc, distance
⎞
⎟⎠ (12)
The first term, sumgdp, is expected to be positive as larger combined market size will encourage
foreign production. The second term, gdpdiﬀsq, squared diﬀerences in GDP between the host and
10For a detailed discussion of the knowledge-capital model and its empirical implementation, see Markusen’s (2002)
book.
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the parent country of foreign investment, is expected to be negative as unequal-sized countries
should encourage exporting rather than setting up a plant in the foreign market.
The next three terms are more complicated interaction terms. The third term, d2skdgdpd,
interacts skill diﬀerences with GDP diﬀerences and a dummy equal to one if the skilled labor
abundant country is the parent country. Multinationals are discouraged if skill and GDP diﬀerences
are too large since the market of the small country is too small and the skilled labor abundant parent
country has a comparative advantage in (skill-intensive) headquarter services. The other two terms
are interactions of GDP sums and skill diﬀerences. The fourth term, d2skdsumg, is again nonzero
if the parent country is skilled-labor intensive. Skill diﬀerences encourage vertical diﬀerentiation
of the production process, but not horizontal multinationals, since skill diﬀerences make skilled
labor too expensive in that case. Therefore, its sign is theoretically ambiguous. The next term,
d1skdsumg, is nonzero if the skilled labor abundant country is the host country of investment. If
this is the case, inward FDI is discouraged for all types of multinationals since the skilled labor
abundant country would be expected to be the parent, but not the host country of investment. As
a robustness check, we include simpler skill variables for both source and host countries.
Four additional controls are included. First is a measure of the cost of investing in the host
country. It accounts for formal investment barriers as well as the overall economic climate that
aﬀects the decision where to invest. Higher investment costs deter FDI and hence a negative sign is
expected for this regressor. Parent country and host country (Mexican) trade costs are measured by
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, an often used measure for the trade openness of a country.
It is used over others because it is available for the entire sample period. Since greater openness
corresponds to lower trade costs, a positive sign is expected for parent country, but a negative
sign for host country trade costs.11 Finally, distance is measured as the distance between country
capitals. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy for both trade and investment costs.
It is included since it usually performs well in gravity-type models.
11Endogeneity may be a concern with this openness measure. However, other measures such as an index from the
Global Competitiveness Report are highly correlated with any measure of investment cost. In any case, omitting the
openness variables does not change the qualitative results.
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We should note that ascribing the eﬀects that we find solely to NAFTA is clearly problematic
as other events during the time period that we are looking at may aﬀect the pattern of FDI as
well and we have only limited ways to control for those. In addition to NAFTA, Mexico joined
the OECD in 1994, but more importantly, the peso crisis in late 1994, early 1995 led to a steep
real depreciation of the peso, followed by a real appreciation in the years afterwards. We control
for these eﬀects by including Mexican GDP, which fell considerably in 1995. We could also include
exchange rates in order to account more directly for the monetary eﬀects of the crisis, but chose to
follow real trade theory which does not have a role for exchange rates. Moreover, at least the real
appreciation of the peso is likely to be endogenous as it may largely be caused by capital inflows.12
4 Econometric Considerations and Data
4.1 Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were present. Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation can lead to biased standard errors. We implement several proce-
dures to deal with this potential bias. First, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression)
with panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient is assumed to be diﬀerent for each observational unit (country pair), but of the first
order in all cases. The variance-covariance matrix is computed under the assumption that the
disturbances are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across units, where each pair
of cross-sectional units has their own covariance. For each element in the covariance matrix, all
available observations that are common to the two units contributing to the covariance are used to
compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced.13
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample
12We did include exchange rates as a robustness checks, which did not aﬀect the results at all.
13We also ran the regressions under the assumption of a common AR coeﬃcient, which resulted in no qualitative
changes in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results. These are available upon request.
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period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the eﬀects of NAFTA,
we need suﬃcient data for both the pre- and the post-NAFTA time periods. We have at most
seven years of post-NAFTA data (1994-2000) and only use country-pair observations for which we
have at least seven years of pre-NAFTA information for all variables. In order to implement the
correction for autocorrelation, no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap, we
limit ourselves to using post-gap information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is missing,
and 1985 onwards is available, the data for this country-pair starts in 1985. One of the robustness
checks uses a larger number of observations, although a minimum of six must still be imposed in
order to allow for the computation of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients for all country pairs.
In addition to estimating a first-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient, we also used several of the
other techniques Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest. We report results from one which works well
for samples of more than 20 observational units (we have at least 166 country pairs). It requires
estimating standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure between time pe-
riods, using a generalized White-like formula. This estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is
consistent as the number of country pairs tends to infinity. We report results from this procedure
since it turns out to be the only one for which the results are qualitatively diﬀerent.14
4.2 Data
Mexican FDI data come from the Mexican National Statistical Institute (INEGI). These are FDI
stocks in Mexico from 1980 on, published in U.S. dollars. In the empirical analysis, nominal values
are converted to real dollars using the U.S. producer price index for capital equipment. The data
distinguish ten source countries throughout the sample period. They account for about 90 percent
of total FDI in Mexico. Since 1994, more source country and especially industry detail is available,
but since we need suﬃcient pre-1994 data, we cannot use the additional detail in this study. No
industry or additional source country detail is available retroactively for the time before NAFTA.
14Using their suggested bootstrapping method gave us qualitatively very similar results to our basic methodology
of estimating pairwise autocorrelation coeﬃcients.
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For most of the 1980s, investment flows exhibit large variation, for example around the time of
Mexico’s financial crisis in the early 1980s, but do not increase much over time. They do increase
noticeably in the late 1980s and then a large and sustained increase occurs with the inception of
NAFTA. The first substantial increase in FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with
a major overhaul of Mexico’s investment laws in 1989. Many obstacles to foreign investors, such
as licensing requirements and restrictions pertaining to majority ownership, were removed. This
change reversed Mexico’s long-standing policy of reserving ownership in many sectors to Mexican
nationals or the Mexican state and encouraging foreign investment only in sectors that were deemed
crucial to the pursuit of import substitution policies. At the same time, and earlier than in many
other countries in the region, substantial privatizations occurred. By 1994, the number of state-
owned enterprises had decreased to only 80, down from 1155. However, as Franko (1999: 158-61)
points out, foreign investors participated in this sale only to a small degree. FDI from privatization
constituted only 7.9 percent of total FDI between 1990 and 1995. Yet, during the first half of the
1990s, Mexico was the major recipient of FDI in Latin America. Brazil subsequently surpassed
Mexico in that role, mainly because Brazil’s major privatizations occurred in the second half of
the 1990s. Lately, greenfield investment and acquisitions of local firms have dominated in Mexico.
In 1997, 62 percent of FDI consisted of international investors acquiring local firms. According to
CEPAL (1999), recent large acquisitions include several banks, beverage and tobacco companies.
The United States has been the most important source country both before and after 1994.
Sizable flows have also originated in European Union countries and Japan. The share of North
American investment in Mexico in terms of stocks has been relatively stable over the sample period,
fluctuating between about 69 and 74 percent. The vast majority of foreign investment originates
in other high-income countries. The only sizable investment flows from other countries are from
South Korea (now also considered high-income) and India, the latter being largely a one-time large
purchase of a Mexican steel company.
U.S. inward and outward FDI data come from the standard source used in most studies of U.S.
FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data are described in detail elsewhere. Figure
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1 shows the evolution of FDI in Mexico by source and the United States since 1980. OECD FDI
data come from the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics.
Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data from
the Penn World Tables (6.2). Trade data come from the same source. For investment costs, we
use the comprehensive measure from Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), which is a
composite measure of operations risk, political risk, and a remittance and repatriation factor index.
We adjust it such that a higher number corresponds to higher costs.
An important control variable in many studies is skill. The two most common sources of skill
data are the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee data on schooling. We use
both in our analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. The ILO data measure the number of
workers in a particular occupation and characterize some as skilled, some as unskilled, employing
the skill definitions from Carr et al. (2001). A country’s skill level then is represented by the share
of skilled workers. We fill in missing data using a linear trend between non-missing years. For
just a few countries, additional years are filled in using the growth rate of the skilled labor share
between non-missing years. Alternatively, we use the Barro/Lee data on years of schooling. These
are available only in five-year intervals and we fill in missing values using a linear trend as well.15
Table 3 contains summary statistics for our basic sample with a minimum of 14 observations per
country pair as well as for the larger sample where only a minimum of six observations are required.
5 Results
Tables 4-7 report the results. Tables 4 and 6 show the results from running a Prais-Winsten
regression as outlined above as well as a number of robustness checks. Table 4 uses the ILO skill
data, while Table 6 uses the Barro/Lee skill data. Tables 5 and 7 present the simple diﬀerence and
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation results, which are of central interest here and directly test
Propositions 1-3.
15Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results.
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Specification (1) is our base specification. The sample contains only source-host country pairs
for which we have at least 14 observations, i.e. suﬃcient pre- and post-NAFTA information.
Specification (2) includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases the sample size
from 2,922 to 5,545 observations. However, many of the newly included country pairs still have
twelve or 13 observations. Specification (3) accounts for a possible announcement eﬀect by starting
the NAFTA regime dummy in 1992 rather than 1994.16
Turning to Table 5, we first notice that there is no evidence whatsoever of a FDI diversion eﬀect
from the U.S. since there is no statistically significant negative sign. In fact, the only statistically
significant coeﬃcient in both the simple diﬀerence (β+δ1) and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator
(δ1) is in column (6), when instead of computing the autocorrelation coeﬃcients, we allow for an
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. In this case, a positive eﬀect on non-NAFTA FDI into the
U.S. is estimated. This result is quite diﬀerent from that in all other specifications and even
though this method worked well for Bertrand et al.’s (2004) data, we are not sure that it is the
case here. For example, consider the average estimated autocorrelation in regressions (1) through
(4). It is roughly between 0.74 and 0.79, much higher than in Bertrand et al.’s data, where the true
autocorrelation is comparable to ours in magnitude. Moreover, they do not allow for individual (in
our case: country-pair specific) autocorrelation coeﬃcients, but impose a common one. Thus, we
maintain that our Prais-Winsten methodology is appropriate and yields good results, but we do
want to alert the reader that these can change when using one specific diﬀerent methodology.
In order to get a sense of the estimated economic eﬀect, we can calculate the predicted amount
of FDI by the final year of the sample period with and without NAFTA. For the significantly
positive coeﬃcient here, we find that this stock is about five percent higher than it would have
been without NAFTA. Thus, while the eﬀect is positive, it is relatively small.17
The results are very similar when using the Barro/Lee skill data (Tables 6 and 7). Again,
16Dating the announcement eﬀect to 1991 or 1993 makes no diﬀerence to the results. These are available upon
request.
17Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted
FDI stocks is 0.65, statistically significant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies (2004) find that in their
data, the residuals are unreasonably large and diﬀer systematically between rich and poor countries. Our residuals
appear to be of reasonable size and do not diﬀer in any systematic way.
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none of the computed eﬀects using the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator are significantly negative,
though allowing for the arbitrary variance-covariance matrix again yields a statistically significant,
though economically small positive coeﬃcient.18 We thus conclude that there is no evidence of a
FDI diversion eﬀect from the U.S.
The next row of Tables 5 and 7 addresses FDI from NAFTA partners into Mexico. There is
a statistically significant and economically large positive eﬀect, suggesting that NAFTA has led
to an increase in FDI in Mexico from partners. All coeﬃcients, whether simple diﬀerence (β+δ2)
or diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (δ2), are positive and significant regardless of specification, again with
the exception of those making use of the arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. The economic
magnitude is such that the inward FDI stock in 2000 is about 12 percent higher than it would have
been without NAFTA. We stress again that this eﬀect includes events that we did not control for.
Nonetheless, NAFTA appears to have had an important eﬀect on partner FDI in Mexico.19
The final row in Tables 5 and 7 shows the estimated NAFTA-eﬀect on FDI from non-NAFTA
sources into Mexico. All twelve diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are negative, half of them, in-
cluding all those using the arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, significantly so. The estimated
economic magnitude ranges from a 1.5 to a seven percent lower FDI stock. We can conclude that we
find some evidence of a decrease of non-partner FDI in Mexico during the NAFTA period, though
it is neither strong nor large. Coupled with the (weak) evidence of an increase in non-NAFTA FDI
in the U.S., this finding seems to clearly indicate no export-platform FDI eﬀect due to NAFTA.
Instead, it suggests that, firstly, the access to the U.S. market from Mexico was not greatly aﬀected
by NAFTA, and secondly, that onerous rules of origin may indeed have had a significant investment
preventing eﬀect for investments from countries located outside of North America, which import a
significant amount of their intermediates from their home countries. The findings underscore that
it is misleading to ascribe the observed increase in the raw numbers of FDI following NAFTA to the
18Expanding the control group to include Canadian and U.S. outward FDI results in unchanged statistical sig-
nificance, although using the arbitrary variance-covariance matrix roughly doubles the economic magnitude of the
NAFTA-induced change on FDI to just over ten percent.
19The estimated magnitude is smaller than what Waldkirch (2003) and Cuevas et al. (2005) find. Recall that the
estimated eﬀect is not the isolated increase observed in Mexico, but that which goes beyond the global rise and what
can be explained by other determinants of FDI.
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agreement as doing so fails to control for other important determinants, such as the economic boom
in the U.S., and the global rise in FDI. The diﬀerential results with respect to NAFTA partner
and non-NAFTA FDI into Mexico also show the importance of distinguishing between these two
fundamentally diﬀerent sources of FDI.
The coeﬃcients on the determinants of FDI in the first half of Tables 4a/4b and 6a/6b largely
have the expected signs and are statistically significant, although the choice of skill data apparently
matters. As shown in other work, total market size has a large positive eﬀect on FDI, whereas mar-
ket size diﬀerences deter it. The signs on the skill variables are mostly consistent with Markusen’s
knowledge-capital model, although more so when using the ILO skill data. Consistent with the
predictions of that model, both source and host country openness have a positive eﬀect on FDI,
whereas our investment cost measure does not appear to perform well. This may be because of a
lack of variation in the measure, especially over time.
In summary, we find that there is ample evidence that North-South economic integration in
NAFTA has aﬀected the distribution of FDI in the region, although not always in line with con-
ventional wisdom. There is no evidence of an export-platform eﬀect, although the South (Mexico)
appears to have succeeded in attracting additional investment from the Northern partner countries.
There is no evidence of an investment diversion eﬀect from the U.S. The inclusion of determinants
of FDI that are well-established in the literature, a careful econometric specification that corrects
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, a large control group, and the use of various measures
of skill endowments make us confident that our results provide a good assessment of the eﬀect of
NAFTA on the pattern of FDI.
6 Conclusion and Directions for Future Work
This paper has investigated the eﬀect of North-South integration on the location of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in both regions. We built a simple three-country model of location choice. While
the model is straightforward, it generates several interesting propositions. There is a possibility
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that NAFTA results in FDI diversion from the United States. While FDI in Mexico is likely to
increase, the incentives for firms from NAFTA partners versus non-partner countries are aﬀected
diﬀerently. This is due to the existence of the Maquiladora program before NAFTA, but also to
strict rules of origin and a possible commitment eﬀect that aﬀect partner countries more than
non-partner ones.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that combines U.S., Mexican and bilateral OECD FDI
data to test these hypotheses. Using a careful econometric analysis, we find that NAFTA partner
FDI in Mexico was positively aﬀected by NAFTA. At the same time, there is no evidence of FDI
diversion from the U.S. Non-NAFTA firms have been using Mexico as an export platform to the
U.S. well before NAFTA and we find no evidence that NAFTA has resulted in an increasing use
of Mexico as a production location for these countries. If anything, FDI may have decreased. This
finding begs a more thorough investigation of the role of discriminatory regulations in FTAs such
as rules of origin, which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The results are robust to the nature of the skill endowment data chosen, the consideration of
an “announcement” eﬀect as well as to the inclusion of country-pair observations with a shorter
time series. Moreover, we carefully take the serial correlation in the data into account and employ
specifications that avoid biasing our standard errors. We do add the caveat, however, that use of an
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, one of the methodologies proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004)
to deal with the serial correlation problem in the use of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, does
aﬀect the results somewhat.
In future work, we will consider several extensions, both to the theory and the empirics. The
theory should incorporate plant-level scale economies through an integrated equilibrium approach.
We also envision a dynamic rather than a static game for economic integration, which will be
capable of including announcement and commitment eﬀects more formally. On the empirical side,
we note that even in its current form, our model also provides a rich set of results regarding the
eﬀect of NAFTA on trade within the region as well as with other countries. These conclusions can
be tested using available trade data. We are especially interested in separating out the eﬀects on
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intermediate versus final goods trade.
We also emphasize that we do not wish to imply that the addition of Mexico has had no eﬀect
on the distribution of FDI between Canada and the U.S. However, this raises a host of diﬀerent
questions, which deserve their separate treatment, which we undertake in Waldkirch and Tekin-
Koru (2008).
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Appendix
Aggregate profit to firms e and u from sales in country U with production location configuration
L and market quantity choice xh(l) can be expressed respectively as follows:
Πe(l, xe(l)) = (1− t)[φ− θX(l)]xe(l)− bce(le)xe(l)− 2F
Πu(l, xu(l)) = (1− t)[φ− θX(l)]xu(l)− bcu(lu)xu(l)− 2F
where Xk(l) = xe(l) + xu(l).
Maximizing these two equations with respect to xe(l) and xu(l) in that order and solving for
xe(l) and xu(l) in the first order conditions gives the equilibrium profit levels for each firm as
Πe(l, xe(l)) = (1− t)θ[xe(l)]2 − 2F
Πu(l, xu(l)) = (1− t)θ[xu(l)]2 − 2F
where
xe(l) =
(1− t)2φ+ (1− t)bcu(lu)− 2(1− t)bce(le)
3(1− t)2θ and
xu(l) =
(1− t)2φ+ (1− t)bce(le)− 2(1− t)bcu(lu)
3(1− t)2θ
Proof of Lemma 1
The necessary condition for l∗ = {EM,UU} before integration is given by the following in-
equalities:
Πubi(EM,UU) > Π
u
bi(EM,UM) (13)
Πebi(EM,UU) > Π
e
bi(EU,UU) (14)
Πebi(EM,UU) > Π
e
bi(EE,UU) (15)
which yield respectively
(1− t)[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(t− 1)2 − (1− t)1/2(1− 3t)]| {z }
A2
(16)
−cN [2(1− t)3/2]| {z }
A3
+ cM [(1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + 3t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A5
(17)
−cN [(1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
+ 2cM < 0
cN − cM > tzN (18)
Compare (16) and (17). Assuming t ∈ (0, 1), the following will hold: (i) 0 < (1 − t)A1 < A1, (ii)
0 < A2 < A5 and (iii) 0 < A3 < A4 < 2. Moreover, since cN > cM > 0, zN > 0 and φ > 0,
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when (16) holds, (17) does not hold. In other words, if Πubi(EM,UU) > Π
u
bi(EM,UM), then
Πebi(EM,UU) < Π
e
bi(EU,UU) for all parameter values, which violates condition (14), one of the
the necessary conditions for l∗ = {EM,UU}.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let firm u choose lu = UM as its optimum strategy after integration. FDI diversion in U
requires le = EU to be dominated by any other strategy for firm e. The necessary condition is
Πeai(EU,UM) < Π
e
ai(EE,UM) (19)
which yields
[φ+ zN + cM − 2(1 + t)zN − 2cN ]2
9θ
<
[φ+ zN + cM − 2(1 + t)zN − 2cM ]2
9θ
(20)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (20) and simplifying yields cM < cN which is
always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let firm e choose le = EE as its optimum strategy. FDI creation in M by firm u requires
lu = UU to be dominated by lu = UM .
Πuai(EE,UU) < Π
u
ai(EE,UM) (21)
which yields
[(1− t)φ+ zN + cN − 2(1− t)(zN + cN)]2
9(1− t)2θ <
[(1− t)φ+ zN + cN − 2(1− t)(zN + cM)]2
9(1− t)2θ (22)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (22) and simplifying yields cN > cM which is
always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 3
For l∗ = {EU,UU} before integration, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are
Πubi(EU,UU) > Π
u
bi(EU,UM) (23)
Πebi(EU,UU) > Π
e
bi(EM,UU) (24)
For l∗ = {EM,UM} after integration, the necessary condition is
Πeai(EM,UM) > Π
e
ai(EE,UM) (25)
Suppose that (23) holds. Expression (24) yields
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
(26)
+cN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2]| {z }
A7
> 0
and expression (25) yields
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
+ 2cN (27)
−cM [((1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
Provided that t ∈ (0, 1), A4 + A7 = 2. Thus, since cN > cM when expression (26) holds, so does
expression (27).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
14+ Observations 6+ Observations
Regressor Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
realfdi (’000s $) 5,035 699.7 15,365 2,864 195.8 11,421
sumgdp (mill. $) 2,912 1,830 2,736 2,105 1,213 2,448
gdpdiﬀsq 1.2E07 1.2E06 2.2E07 7.8E06 311,543 1.87E07
d2skdgdpd (ILO) 11.67 0 164.1 2.933 0 126.2
d2skdsumg (ILO) 95.85 0 198.8 74.96 1.415 158.1
d1skdsumg (ILO) 205.4 9.782 409.0 156.0 0 362.0
Skill source (ILO) 0.264 0.283 0.098 0.267 0.288 0.102
Skill host (ILO) 0.271 0.290 0.094 0.261 0.282 0.099
d2skdgdpd (Barro/Lee) 546.7 0 3,621 98.35 0 2,965
d2skdsumg (Barro/Lee) 2,112 0 5,085 1,548 0 4,046
d1skdsumg (Barro/Lee) 8,744 630.0 16,358 6,307 1,070 13,625
Skill source (Barro/Lee) 8.340 8.859 1.952 7.642 8.395 2.516
Skill host (Barro/Lee) 9.002 9.161 2.525 8.801 9.027 2.205
invcosthost (Index) 37.97 31.73 12.02 39.56 39.67 11.90
topenhost (%) 52.03 44.22 45.82 60.76 52.33 51.17
topensrc (%) 64.05 52.44 50.51 72.10 59.55 55.01
distance (km) 6,462 6,257 4,893 6,766 6,909 4,963
NAFTA dummy 0.40 0 0.49 0.56 1 0.50
US Host dummy 0.47 0 0.50 0.14 0 0.35
Mexico Host to
NAFTA FDI dummy 0.01 0 0.12 0.01 0 0.09
Mexico Host to
non-NAFTA FDI dummy 0.06 0 0.23 0.03 0 0.17
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Table 4a: Prais-Winsten Regression Results: ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3)
Regressor 14+ observation 6+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
sumgdp 12.11*** 7.347*** 12.09***
(1.433) (0.743) (1.450)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
d2skdgdpd -16.12*** -15.06*** -15.95***
(2.696) (2.262) (2.735)
d2skdsumg 4.488* 5.034** 2.787
(2.560) (2.161) (2.417)
d1skdsumg -9.612*** -9.327*** -10.68***
(1.529) (1.157) (1.498)
invcosthost -7.063 -45.35*** 24.75
(40.59) (16.82) (40.24)
topenhost 30.36*** 14.30*** 34.27***
(4.910) (1.854) (5.188)
topensrc 28.50*** 9.911*** 31.23***
(6.507) (1.662) (7.161)
distance -0.466*** -0.180*** -0.501***
(0.112) (0.045) (0.117)
β -578.1 -420.7 -938.8*
(531.1) (312.1) (2,181)
γ1 -24,213*** -12,693*** -22,206***
(4,536) (3,265) (4,860)
γ2 -7,347** 4,656 -6,729
(3,735) (4,270) (4,117)
γ3 480.7 -1,069* 309.5
(774.4) (567.2) (782.5)
δ1 -98.22 584.0 417.8
(1,801) (1,677) (1,760)
δ2 6,579** 6,806** 5,836**
(2,742) (3,035) (2,780)
δ3 -1,174 -677.6 -931.9
(722.0) (438.3) (761.4)
Number of obs. 2,922 5,545 2,922
R2 0.30 0.26 0.30
Wald χ2 746.0 498.4 473.7
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.772 0.789 0.772
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for
first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country pair.
Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details.
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Table 4b: Robustness Checks: ILO Skill Data
(4) (5) (6)
Regressor Simple Skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple Skill
sumgdp 10.90*** 7.829*** 7.786***
(1.326) (2.131) (1.944)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
d2skdgdpd -21.52***
(7.464)
d2skdsumg 16.08***
(5.427)
d1skdsumg -5.762
(3.854)
Skill source 46,887*** 40,357***
(8,406) (11,470)
Skill host 1,423 3,898
(2,885) (7,140)
invcosthost -11.70 -55.47 0.279
(40.33) (61.45) (63.60)
topenhost 19.56*** 18.36 15.81
(4.464) (12.20) (13.34)
topensrc 16.56** 20.40 17.63
(6.806) (14.61) (13.57)
distance -0.518*** -0.309* -0.237
(0.100) (0.160) (0.161)
β -958.9 -4,448* -5,506**
(598.6) (2,370) (2,425)
γ1 -23,493*** -1,075 -215.3
(4,824) (5,994) (6,101)
γ2 -16,858*** 2,248 -305.0
(4,037) (5,633) (3,426)
γ3 1,935*** -347.3 854.8
(665.6) (1,753) (2,010)
δ1 882.4 14,916 18,844**
(1,833) (9,109) (8,786)
δ2 7,474*** 19,742 20,113
(2,726) (16,674) (15,793)
δ3 -1,284** -3,746*** -2,491**
(564.7) (945.7) (1,025)
Number of obs. 2,922 2,922 2,922
R2 0.28 0.38 0.34
Wald χ2 317.0 . .
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 . .
Average autocorr. 0.741 N/A N/A
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Specification (4) corrects for
first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country pair.
Covariances vary across country pairs. Specifications (5) and (6) compute an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix. See the text for details.
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Table 5: The Eﬀect of NAFTA on North American FDI, ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3)
14+ observations 6+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
Simple diﬀerence -676.3 163.3 -521.0
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,744) (1,461) (1,691)
Simple Diﬀerence 6,001** 6,385** 4,897*
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,581) (2,787) (2,603)
Simple Diﬀerence -1,752** -1,098* -1,871**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (804.1) (575.8) (855.1)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -98.22 584.0 417.8
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,801) (1,677) (1,760)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 6,579** 6,806** 5,836**
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,742) (3,035) (2,780)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -1,174 -677.6 -931.9
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ3 (722.0) (438.3) (761.4)
(4) (5) (6)
Simple skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple skill
Simple diﬀerence -76.57 10,468 13,388**
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,704) (6,938) (6,560)
Simple diﬀerence 6,515*** 15,294 14,607
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,484) (16,280) (15,490)
Simple diﬀerence -2,243*** -8,194*** -7,997**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (757.6) (3,026) (3,158)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 882.4 14,916 18,844**
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,833) (9,109) (8,786)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 7,474*** 19,742 20,113
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,726) (16,674) (15,793)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -1,284** -3,746*** -2,491**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ3 (564.7) (945.7) (1,025)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Tables 4a and 4b.
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Table 6a: Prais-Winsten Regression Results: Barro/Lee Skill Data
(7) (8) (9)
Regressor 14+ observation 6+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
sumgdp 10.37*** 6.206*** 9.967***
(1.303) (0.696) (1.273)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.0004*** -0.002** -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
d2skdgdpd 0.797*** 0.479*** 0.738***
(0.155) (0.034) (0.141)
d2skdsumg -1.150*** -0.743*** -1.184***
(0.191) (0.108) (0.194)
d1skdsumg -0.661*** -0.658*** -0.757***
(0.083) (0.077) (0.094)
invcosthost 111.8** 13.79 127.7**
(49.20) (14.71) (49.62)
topenhost 17.01*** 6.673*** 16.79***
(4.712) (1.687) (4.697)
topensrc 28.89*** 6.666*** 31.16***
(7.017) (1.268) (7.194)
distance -0.731*** -0.333*** -0.711***
(0.172) (0.067) (0.171)
β -406.4 -371.6 -1,056*
(567.6) (277.2) (548.1)
γ1 -6,995 5,331 -2,144
(5,788) (4,570) (6,676)
γ2 -3,202 6,438 -1,949
(2,965) (4,520) (3,352)
γ3 2,571*** -123.4 1,713**
(873.0) (548.8) (844.1)
δ1 727.9 1,324 1,297
(1,758) (1,661) (1,783)
δ2 5,954** 6,838** 4,472*
(2,329) (2,748) (2,324)
δ3 -990.6 -440.5 -520.9
(700.8) (409.9) (735.9)
Number of obs. 3,453 7,730 3,453
R2 0.33 0.25 0.35
Wald χ2 772.7 4,173 1,300
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.732 0.757 0.738
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for
first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country pair.
Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details.
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Table 6b: Robustness Checks: Barro/Lee Skill Data
(10) (11) (12)
Regressor Simple Skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple Skill
sumgdp 9.051*** 7.001*** 6.308***
(1.130) (1.772) (1.629)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
d2skdgdpd 0.785***
(0.245)
d2skdsumg -0.771***
(0.238)
d1skdsumg -0.404***
(0.124)
Skill source 2,042*** 1,653***
(333.4) (442.5)
Skill host 886.1*** 1,090***
(238.2) (323.4)
invcosthost 58.45 95.85 111.2**
(48.99) (60.15) (55.33)
topenhost 26.82*** 11.38 23.97**
(6.356) (9.851) (10.92)
topensrc 25.03*** 26.75** 24.03**
(6.688) (13.19) (12.14)
distance -0.779*** -0.512*** -0.462***
(0.175) (0.180) (0.165)
β -632.0 4,034** -4,098*
(617.7) (1,851) (2,103)
γ1 -19,905*** 10,868* -290.6
(5,006) (6,071) (5,729)
γ2 -16,461*** 3,108 -937.0
(3,855) (5,102) (3,334)
γ3 5,829*** 1,540 3,305*
(992.4) (1,622) (1,767)
δ1 1,087 18,174** 17,022**
(1,763) (7,153) (8,095)
δ2 6,412*** 18,622 18,996
(2,397) (14,474) (14,952)
δ3 -1,038* -2,398*** -2,304**
(628.2) (838.4) (930.3)
Number of obs. 3,453 3,453 3,453
R2 0.29 0.32 0.29
Wald χ2 2,073 . .
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 . .
Average autocorr. 0.737 N/A N/A
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Specification (10) corrects
for first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country
pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. Specifications (11) and (12) compute an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix. See the text for details.
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Table 7: The Eﬀect of NAFTA on North American FDI, Barro/Lee Skill Data
(7) (8) (9)
14+ observations 6+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
Simple diﬀerence 321.5 952.4 240.7
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,784) (1,477) (1,805)
Simple Diﬀerence 5,548** 6,467** 3,416
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,205) (2,532) (2,163)
Simple Diﬀerence -1,397* -812.2* -1,577*
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (764.3) (491.2) (846.9)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 727.9 1,324 1,297
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,758) (1,661) (1,783)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 5,954** 6,838** 4,472*
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,329) (2,748) (2,324)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -990.6 -440.5 -520.9
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ3 (700.8) (409.9) (735.9)
(10) (11) (12)
Simple skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple skill
Simple diﬀerence 455.4 14,140** 12,924**
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,772) (5,445) (6,117)
Simple diﬀerence 5,780*** 14,588 14,898
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,216) (14,246) (14,699)
Simple diﬀerence -1,670** -6,432*** -6,402**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (764.8) (2,420) (2,734)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 1,087 18,174** 17,022**
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,763) (7,153) (8,095)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 6,412*** 18,622 18,996
NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,397) (14,474) (14,952)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -1,038* -2,398*** -2,304**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico - δ3 (628.2) (838.4) (930.3)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Tables 6a and 6b.
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Figure 1: FDI Stock in the United States and Mexico, various Sources (billions of dollars)
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